Abstract. We present a study of price impact in the over-the-counter credit index market, where no limit order book is used. Contracts are traded via dealers, that compete for the orders of clients. Despite this distinct microstructure, we successfully apply the propagator technique to estimate the price impact of individual transactions. Because orders are typically split less than in multilateral markets, impact is observed to be mainly permanent, in line with theoretical expectations. A simple method is presented to correct for errors in our classification of trades between buying and selling. We find a very significant, temporary increase in order flow correlations during late 2015 and early 2016, which we attribute to increased order splitting or herding among investors. We also find indications that orders advertised to less dealers may have lower price impact. Quantitative results are compatible with earlier findings in other more classical markets, further supporting the argument that price impact is a universal phenomenon, to a large degree independent of market microstructure.
1. Introduction
Price impact
Liquidity in financial markets is an elusive concept, with many definitions in existence. From a practical point of view, however, one of its most important metrics is the response of price to buying and selling. This reaction is called price impact, and it has been treated in a long series of empirical papers (see e.g. Almgren et al. [2005] , Bouchaud et al. [2004 Bouchaud et al. [ , 2009 , Hasbrouck [1991] , Moro et al. [2009] , Tóth et al. [2011] and refs. therein). One of the most important findings is that impact is not only mechanical but dynamic, meaning that it cannot be described exclusively by the revealed supply or demand at any given time -say the content of the visible limit order book [Weber and Rosenow, 2005] . It is rather related to underlying "latent" supply and demand , Tóth et al., 2011 which correspond to the intentions of market participants, and which manifest themselves over time. Most of the recent studies of impact have been carried out on transparent, listed markets. Nevertheless, many aspects of price impact appear to be universal, i.e. common to many asset classes, even to exotic ones Bonart, 2015, Tóth et al., 2016] .
In this paper, we will continue the exploration by presenting the price impact of individual transactions in credit indices, where trading does not take place in limit order books. The remainder of this section introduces these products, briefly surveys the relevant literature, and presents the data used for our study. Section 2 then describes a naive approach to calculate impact based on a standard propagator technique. Section 3 looks at the effect of misclassification between buy and sell trades, and corrects the resulting biases in our results. Section 4 discusses a temporary pattern of increased order splitting and higher impact observed in the data. Section 5 finds indications that the impact of trades increases with the number of dealers involved. Finally Section 6 concludes.
The credit index market
Today the credit index market is fairly mature. The most liquid derivative products are proposed by Markit, we will look at four of them: two US based indices CDX IG (for Investment Grade) and CDX HY (for High Yield), and their European counterparts iTraxx Europe and iTraxx Crossover, respectively. These correspond to baskets of CDSs [Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2014] , each of which represents an insurance on bonds of a given corporate issuer within the respective grade and geographical zone. The instruments are standardized, their mechanics very much resembles futures contracts, and they roll once every 6 months. At the time of the roll a new maturity is issued, these are called "series", for example S23, S24 and S25 for iTraxx Europe. On any given day most of the liquidity is concentrated in the most recently issued five-year series of each index at the time, in the following we will only study these (see table  1 ).
One particularity of this market -as opposed to stocks or futures -is that it is purely over-the-counter (OTC), currently without any liquid limit order book. Information is fragmented, there is no single, central source to verify when one is looking for tradable prices, client orders pass through a large number of dealers instead. The latter usually do provide indicative bid/ask prices, but the actual trades are mostly done via Request for Quotes (RFQ), see also Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] . This means that the client (liquidity taker) auctions off its trades to the liquidity providers, by sending them information about the conditions of the deal (which product, buy or sell, size) either electronically or by voice, receiving competing quotes in return, and taking the best price.
To counteract the bilateral design of OTC markets which favors opacity, the Dodd-Frank Act has mandated several changes. Among them are obligatory posttrade reporting, and the creation of Swap Exchange Facilities (SEFs) which provide an organized framework to dealing in eligible OTC instruments. Today a large portion of trades is required to go through SEFs, whose volume is predominantly done via electronic RFQ. Even though they provide order books, those are -for the momentempty.
Literature review
Credit trading has received considerably less attention than equities or futures, and most studies have been done by or in collaboration with regulators who have privileged access to non-anonymous data. Gehde-Trapp et al. [2015] study records from the German Bundesbank regarding single-name CDS issues. They find significant price impact using a model where the effect of each trade is permanent. Shachar [2012] of the New York Federal Reserve defines buy/sell orders by assuming that the initiator of the trades is the end-user (as opposed to the dealer), and focuses to a large extent on the inventory management of dealers. The study finds evidence of "hot-potato" trading [Lyons, 1997] whereby an initial client trade changes hands among dealers several times, while its effect is being gradually incorporated into the price. Loon and Zhong [2016] of the Securities and Exchange Commission focus on the same credit indices as our study. Their work takes a policy-maker's point of view, and argues that the wider transparency created by the Dodd-Frank Act has improved several metrics of liquidity. They focus particularly on the transitory period during the introduction of the reform, whereas we will consider more recent data where market structure is already relatively stable. Finally, Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] analyze both electronic and voice trading in single-name CDS. Most notably they identify price impact related to information leakage, especially when the client requests prices from many dealers, and even if he finally decides not to trade.
The dataset
Our period of study is 17 June 2015 -31 August 2016. For the four products we have recorded a semi-realtime (several updates per minute) indicative data feed via a service called CBBT (Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader) . This represents a continuous, electronic poll of recent executable prices from dealers. Nevertheless, it is not a bid or ask price, only an indicative level around which one expects to be able to transact. At some time t the indicative price is quoted as a credit spread s t , which is the annualized insurance premium in basis points. ‡ In the following we will express all prices as basis points of the typical credit spread itself, meaning
where · denotes a time average. ‡ Note that the quoting convention for CDX HY is different from the rest, but the credit spread can be recalculated based on the available prices. Anonymous information about trades is also available from a different source: trade repositories mandated by regulation. We have used the records of two such organizations. § These include a substantial part of all trades with credit spread, timestamp, volume and other additional information.
While the data are rich and relatively clean, the two sources (prices and trades) are independent, and there is no a priori reason for perfect synchronization between the two.
Naive propagators
Price impact is often analyzed in the context of linear models, where the market price m t just before trade t is written as a linear combination of the time dependent impact of past trades [Bouchaud et al., 2004] :
( 1) t is the sign of the trade at time t (+ for buyer, − for seller initiated trades), and η t is an independent noise term. G( ) is called the 'propagator', and it describes how the price at time t is modified due to the trade at t − . In equity and futures markets, this propagator is found to decay with time, i.e. a large part of price impact is transient rather than permanent (for a recent study of the long term behaviour of G( ) in equities, see Brokmann et al. [2015] ). In order to calibrate the model (1) one calculates the response function R( ), which is defined as
and which quantifies the price move after a trade, but not necessarily due to the trade. One then measures the autocorrelation of order signs, which is is customarily defined as
(3) § Data from Bloomberg SDRV is available at http://www.bloombergsdr.com/, and from the DTCC at http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data. And finally one solves the linear equation [Bouchaud et al., 2006 ]
to map out the numerical value of G( ).
To guess the sign of trades one often relies on some heuristic. If we denote the price of trade t by p t , then simply
An example of transaction and reference prices is shown in figure 1. As one can see from figure 2, the shape of C( ) is well fitted by a stretched exponential. This is true for most individual products and on average across them, and it is in contrast with earlier studies in order book markets, where C( ) rather decays as a slow, power-law function [Bouchaud et al., 2009] . In the latter liquidity at good prices is often small [Bouchaud et al., 2006] , so large orders tend to be sliced, producing a long-range autocorrelation of small trades. In OTC markets clients are encouraged to request deals that correspond to their full liquidity needs, so that after the trade is done, the dealer offloading the inventory just acquired will not have to compete for liquidity with the same client. Since trades are bilateral, the dealer knows the identity of the client, and can reward or penalize it by adjusting the bid-ask spread according to any adverse selection perceived on earlier deals [Osler et al., 2016] .
In fact, it is much better to solve numerically the corresponding equation for the discrete derivative of G in terms of the discrete derivative of R. This is what we have done in this paper.
Since the order sign process is not long range correlated, its autocorrelation function is integrable and one can therefore define an effective number of correlated orders via
This value varies between 1.2 and 14.2, as reported in table 1. These differences are due to time periods, we will study this point further in Section 4
We can calculate the propagator via (4), their average across products is given in figure 3 . Bouchaud et al. [2004] have shown that if C( ) has a power-law form, then the propagator should itself decay over time as a power-law in order to maintain the efficiency of prices. In other words, impact is mostly transient in that case. On the other hand, since our C( ) is short ranged, the same argument predicts that G( ) should tend to a constant for large , corresponding to a non-zero permanent impact component. This is indeed what we observe, see figure 3 .
Calculating G from R involves inverting a matrix whose elements are related to C. This operation amplifies the noise in the correlations, and so it is useful to also give approximate formulas that avoid this. If we know that G is increasing before converging to a fixed value, and C is positive, then from (4) one can find two bounds on G( ). In the limit when C( ) reaches zero much more quickly than G( ) goes to its asymptotic value, we can write for large that
Conversely, if we assume that G saturates immediately, then R will be maximal, and for large we get
Figure 3 shows these bounds which are not excessively wide, as well as the real G calculated numerically. In reality the propagator -which was not observed in previous studies -increases steeply but continuously in the initial period. This makes sense in the absence of a central orderbook: The information that someone bought or sold takes a finite time of 5 − 10 trades to diffuse in the market and to get incorporated into the price.
Beyond the propagators which give a microscopic description of price moves, one can also look at a more aggregate characterization by dividing the data into 15 minute bins. Then one can calculate in each bin b the net signed notional defined as
where the sum runs over trades in the bin, and Q t is the notional value of trade t. As a function of this quantity one can calculate the average price change r b = m b − m b−1 over the bin. Figure 4 confirms a strong correlation, similar results can be obtained regardless of the precise time scale. Note the concavity of this plot, also observed in many other markets with order books (see e.g. [Bouchaud et al., 2009] , figure 2.5). Although we do not have enough statistics to test on our trades the √ Q impact law universally observed in all markets studied so far, we believe that the concave shape seen in figure 4 is compatible with the general "latent liquidity" idea of , Tóth et al. [2011] . (6) and (7). Note that as expected these are only valid for large . (blue line) The true, biasadjusted propagator G true ( ) calculated with the fits of C true ( ) and R true ( ), and divided by a factor 3 for better readability.
Correction for the noise in order signs
In the previous section we have confirmed the existence of price impact in OTC credit indices. However, the magnitude of the effect remains to be validated for the following reason. It is known that the heuristic (5) for identifying order signs does not always give correct results. If t is incorrect, naturally all expectation values calculated from it will be incorrect as well. In order to verify such biases in our results, we are going to use a proprietary dataset including 252 trades executed over the same period by our firm (CFM).
As opposed to the detected trade sign t , let us introduce the notation true t for the true sign of the same order, which is not a priori known, except for those of CFM. It is also convenient to introduce an auxiliary variable q t that is 1 when we classified the trade correctly, and 0 when we did not. This way
If we look at the above mentioned CFM trades, the rate of correct classification, described by the average q t t∈CFM , is only 72%. This value is constant within noise level across different months in the sample. As a first step we would like to show that basic correlations of the detected order signs t are the same in the CFM subset of trades and the rest. Let us compare C( ) = t t+ with the subsample average
where we conditioned on at least one of the trades belonging to CFM. Figure 5 shows that there is a fair match, especially for short lags. This gives an indication that other statistics calculated on CFM trades may be approximately similar to the whole market, and can be used in the following.
Let us now look at how misclassification biases our earlier calculations. Let us define
We can readily measure the first term when t ∈ CFM, whereas for ≥ 1 the second term can be rewritten as
For the approximation step we assumed that whether or not we make a mistake in identification is independent of the two-point product of true signs. After reorganization and assuming that we can use CFM trades in part of the correlation, we get
This estimation of C true ( ) is shown in figure 5 .
As for the response function, one can define its "true" variant as
This is related to the response with detected order signs as
In the approximation step we neglect the correlation of identification error and future price change. Finally:
Finally one can define a true propagator G true ( ) via (4) by inserting R true ( ) and C true ( ). If we use (11) and (14) for the approximation of these latter, one can obtain the numerical value of the true propagator averaged over all products, see figure 3. This shows that finally G true ( ) ≈ 3G( ).
Seasonal patterns in order splitting
We now revisit our results to study their variation across time. Figure 6 shows the measured value of N eff in monthly windows. One can see that order correlations intensify at the turn of the year, while at the same time credit spreads climb to a local maximum. Liquidity itself remains roughly constant. In figure 7 we offer a more detailed view of the effect, by showing the cumulative autocorrelation =0 C( ) for each month separately (averages over all products). We do not see much structure in periods of low correlation, while during high correlation C is very positive up to 10-20 trades. Note that the mis-classifier variable q t is reasonably stationary, so that this seasonality is too strong to result from an incorrect classification of trades.
An explanation could be given in the context of the "hot-potato" theory of Lyons [1997] , advocated for credit markets in Shachar [2012] . Clients are expected to trade the full required size in a single deal, so further orders (and hence N eff > 1) could come from the subsequent inter-dealer exchange of risk. In the period of difficult markets liquidity becomes "recycled" as it takes a longer time for the position to find a final counter party to warehouse the risk. This, however, does not explain the increase of R which is shown in figure 8 . Response is amplified in proportion to correlations, which means that these additional trades have full impact, and they likely cause a net variation of dealer inventory [Shachar, 2012] . Hence this is more likely the signature of increased real order splitting or herding among clients, in the spirit of recent papers on transparent markets [Bouchaud et al., 2009] . Loon and Zhong [2016] compare various forms of trading, and argue that in the transitory period after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, increased market transparency has lead to lower trading cost and price impact. Their data dates from 2013, when uncleared and off-SEF trading were still commonplace. In our more recent dataset only 11% of all trades are off-SEF, and in terms of transparency we no longer expect much difference. More importantly though, on-SEF it is mandatory to have at least three competing brokers when requesting a price, whereas on electronic platforms for off-SEF this is at most three brokers. It is common lore among traders that increased competition might reduce instantaneous costs, but as Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] also show, it leads to higher information leakage, and thus more impact.
Comparison of on-SEF and off-SEF trades
It is straightforward to extend (1) to a case where trades are classified into discrete categories π Eisler et al. [2011] , each of which has its own propagator G π . If each trade t falls into category π t , then
We use this technique to separate on-SEF and off-SEF execution, the naive impact kernels and the corresponding theoretical bounds are shown in figure 9 . Indeed, despite the high noise level we find that off-SEF trades have significantly lower impact than on-SEF ones. This is not a result of the orders themselves being smaller, the mean size and the shape of the distribution are nearly identical, see figure 10 . We see this rather as support for the theory of Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] , that price impact grows with the number of dealers involved.
Conclusion
At first the microstructure of the OTC credit index market seems different from that of equity and futures markets, as it is centered around dealers, without a central order book. However, we find that from the point of view of order flow and price impact, the differences are only quantitative. Client orders are much less split, and as a consequence, the impact of an isolated order, as expressed by G, reaches a permanent plateau. The numerical value of impact, after correcting for the imperfect identification of order signs, is the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask spreads in our daily trading experience. This is in line with what is expected based on theoretical arguments about the break-even costs of market making Wyart et al. [2008] . The propagator takes 5 − 10 trades, in real time more than 15 minutes, to reach its final level. Because the market is very fragmented, it takes this long for the effect of a trade to become fully incorporated in the price. . Naive propagators for on-SEF and off-SEF trades. The shaded areas correspond to the theoretical bounds derived from the multi-propagator equivalents of (6) and (7), which are only expected to be valid for large . Qualitatively the behavior is in line with what was observed for other, more frequently studied products. This finding gives further support to the argument that price impact is a universal phenomenon, and it behaves similarly in classical markets and more "exotic" ones such as Bitcoin , options Tóth et al. [2016] and now credit.
